### 1

#### I was adrift that day.

That week, I found out that both my book tour and classes were canceled. With all my newly found time, I lived online, inhaling the fire hose of panic that also felt strangely ambient. In my newsfeed, I began to notice a troubling increase of anti-Asian incidents, which in the beginning was happening mostly abroad: A group of teenagers attacked a young Singaporean man in London, punching and kicking him while shouting about the coronavirus; an Italian bank denied service to a Chinese woman. Then in Texas, [a man stabbed and cut](https://www.cbs7.com/content/news/FIRST-ON-CBS7-Suspect-admitted-to-trying-to-kill-family-at-Midland-Sams-Club-affidavit-says-568837371.html)a Burmese-American family, including two young children, in an attack that the F.B.I. has called a hate crime.

On March 13, the Centers for Disease Control hadn’t yet recommended that everyone wear masks. Most of the people wearing them on the streets — in Chinatown but also all over the city — were Asian immigrants, who probably already knew that it was safer to wear a mask because you could be asymptomatic. But from a xenophobe’s perspective, the face mask seemed to implicate foreigners as agents of diseases. The masks depersonalized their faces, making the stereotypically “inscrutable” Asian face even more inscrutable, effacing even their age and gender, while also telegraphing that the Asian wearer was mute and therefore incapable of talking back if aggressed. I was afraid for the Chinese immigrants I encountered on the street. I wanted to take them aside and tell them it was safer not to wear one because the equipment that protected them — and others — only made them more vulnerable to attack.

I started bookmarking tweets and news reports of racist incidents. A sample:

[An Asian woman](https://twitter.com/RealElizabethHo/status/1238304263467446272) pressed an elevator button with her elbow. A man in the elevator asked, “Oh, coronavirus?” She said, “Don’t have it, but trying to be prepared.” As he was leaving the elevator, he said, “Don’t bring that Chink virus here.”

[An Asian woman](https://twitter.com/erinrose_mager/status/1237939575986716672) walked into a park and a group of mothers screamed for their kids to get away from her.

A middle-aged Asian woman wearing a mask was going for a walk when a woman screamed at her to get away from her.

[A man spat on an Asian man](https://nypost.com/2020/03/25/asian-man-spat-on-in-latest-coronavirus-hate-crime-in-brooklyn-station/) waiting for the subway.

[A man spat on an Asian woman](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/us/chinese-coronavirus-racist-attacks.html) walking to her gym.

[A woman refused a coffee](https://twitter.com/EugeneLeeYang/status/1238575560856498176) from a barista because she thought the barista was Chinese. When the Asian man behind her started telling her how irrational that request was, she snarled, “Are you Chinese?” He retorted, “No, but your ugly-ass knockoff purse is.”

**I never would**havethought that the word “Chink” would have a resurgence in 2020. The word was supposed to be as outdated as those sinister little Chinamen saltshakers I saw in thrift shops. It still thrived among bottom feeders on the internet, but I hadn’t heard it directed at me since I was in my 20s. But now I was encountering that word every time I read about an anti-Asian incident or hearing about its use from friends. I couldn’t process the fact that Americans were hurling that slur at us so openly and with such raw hate. In the past, I had a habit of minimizing anti-Asian racism because it had been drilled into me early on that racism against Asians didn’t exist. Anytime that I raised concerns about a racial comment, I was told that it wasn’t racial. Anytime I brought up an anti-Asian incident, a white person interjected that it was a distraction from the more important issue (and there was always a more important issue). I’ve been conditioned to think my second-class citizenry was low on the scale of oppression and therefore not worth bringing up even though every single Asian-American I know has stories of being emasculated, fetishized, humiliated, underpaid, fired or demoted because of our racial identities.

After President Trump called Covid-19 the “Chinese virus” in March, the Asian Pacific Policy and Planning Council said more than 650 incidents of discrimination directed against Asian-Americans were reported to a website it helps maintain in one week alone. Even after seeing that number, I wondered if anti-Asian racism would be taken seriously. On Twitter, when the novelist R.O. Kwon talked about the surge, an in-law asked doubtfully, “Is it really happening?” Do the reports have to rise to 1,000 a week? 2,000? How many is enough so that the hate will be seen?

Since the coronavirus, what has been happening is a different strain of anti-Asian racism than the kind to which I’m accustomed. Not the kind in which we are invisible or we’re seen as efficient cyborgs. Racism never disappears but adapts to new circumstances when old strains rise from the dark vaults of American history. The recent rise carries the stench of late-19th-century xenophobia. In 1882, the government passed a federal law that banned Chinese laborers from entering the U.S. because of fears they were taking jobs away from whites. They were portrayed as a “degraded” race, a contagion that would stain the morals of white Americans. If black and indigenous people were systematically enslaved, killed and dispossessed of property, the Chinese were excluded from the U.S. altogether, an immigration ban that was essentially a form of global segregation. Chinese immigrants remaining in cities were segregated into squalid quarters. The scholar Joan B. Trauner writes that whites were repulsed by San Francisco’s Chinatown with “its foul and disgusting vapors” and health officials blamed the enclave for spreading every epidemic. One physician said at the time: “The Chinese were the focus of Caucasian animosities, and they were made responsible for mishaps in general. A destructive earthquake would probably be charged to their account.”

The anti-Chinese campaign was widespread, reaching less densely populated areas as well, where Chinese immigrants were afraid to leave their homes because they would be assaulted, even shot at. In 1885, in what is now Tacoma, Wash., white people terrorized the Chinese community by setting fire to their businesses. The xenophobia culminated in a riot in which a white mob drove 300 Chinese immigrants out of their homes. “Using clubs, poles and pistols,” writes the historian Beth Lew-Williams, the mob chased the weeping immigrants out of town in a freezing rain.

“I’m afraid to leave my home not because of coronavirus,” my Asian friends say, half in jest, “but because I don’t want to be a victim of a hate crime.” It doesn’t matter if our families hail from Thailand, Burma or the Philippines. Racism is indiscriminate, carpet bombing groups that bear the slightest resemblance to one another. We don’t have coronavirus. We are coronavirus.

On March 26, almost a week after Gov. Andrew Cuomo of New York ordered all nonessential businesses to close down and everyone to stay indoors, I wore a face mask to the grocery store. My husband had found a box of dust masks when he was cleaning out his studio. Headlines that day announced that the U.S. had the largest number of Covid-19 cases in the world, but the majority of Americans were still not wearing masks. I posted a picture of me wearing a mask on Instagram. “Wish me luck that I don’t get hate-crimed!” I wrote in the caption. My fears still felt performative, as if I didn’t have any right to them — as if I was overreacting — so I was compelled to make light of them.

But once outside, I was genuinely afraid, as if there were guards on the rooftops of South Brooklyn watching me through their sniper scopes. It is jarring to suddenly be so hypervisible. As an East Asian woman, I am more used to being overlooked and underestimated. I walked down our block and made a left on Bond Street, watching a man walk his dog coming my way, expecting him to make visible his fear, but he simply smiled as he walked around me.

The everyday racialized experience is not so much being the target of hate more than the anticipation of it. Will I be bullied because I’m Asian? Will he reject me because I’m Asian? Will they ignore me because I’m Asian? But it also happens when you least expect it. Once, when I was 13 and my sister was 8, we were walking out of a mall in Los Angeles as a white couple were walking in. I thought he was holding the door open for us so we scurried out. “I don’t open the doors for Chinks!” he yelled. Later that evening, I told my father of the incident. He looked both enraged and hurt. But instead of cursing that white man, he demanded that we should always “let them go first.” When I argued back, he said: “You can’t trust them. You don’t know what they’ll say. Always let them go first.”

I’ve told this story before. Every time I tell it, the vividness of the memory fades until it becomes an exhausted anecdote told to those who can only understand racism as a spectacle. Distrust, by the way, doesn’t result in insubordination. Growing up, my distrust of white people manifested itself in a physical unease in which I held my tongue or “let them go first.” It was a survival instinct, to curl myself in, so that there was no surface area vulnerable to insult. I grew out of that when I found my city and my community. I let my guard down. Maybe it was in my head, all along.

A teenage boy [kicked a 59-year-old Asian man](https://nypost.com/2020/03/11/asian-man-is-victim-in-latest-coronavirus-fueled-hate-crime/) in the back.

[A man chased an elderly Asian woman](https://nextshark.com/purell-man-chases-elderly-asian/) down the street with Purell.

[A woman](https://abc7ny.com/assault-hate-crime-bias-attack-coronavirus/6003396/)punched a young Asian woman in the subway, possibly dislocating her jaw.

The photo of the Burmese-American boy in the hospital was released. The stitches are deep and wide, from the back of his head to just below his eyebrow. He looked away from the camera, his eyes averted.

When a coronavirus-related racist incident happened to me, the perpetrator wasn’t white. Like many New Yorkers, I was jaywalking and nearly walked into a Latino deliveryman whizzing by on his bicycle. “Chinese bitch!” he shouted as he rode by. I wasn’t filled with hot rage or a hurt that cut me to the bone. I was just rattled and then sad.

To be Asian in America during the time of coronavirus is to feel very alone. You might think that everyone’s alone during the pandemic. But it’s a different form of isolation carved out by that insidious model-minority myth, with its implication that as long as you worked hard and didn’t ask for handouts, racial inequities could be overcome. Asian-Americans like Andrew Yang double down on the myth. In his recent Washington Post op-ed, he urged Asians to be more American: “Step up, help our neighbors, donate gear, vote, wear red, white and blue.” After 9/11, South Asian cabdrivers beribboned their cars with American flags, which did nothing to curb the Islamophobia. “During World War II, Japanese-Americans volunteered for military duty,” Yang wrote, “to demonstrate that they were Americans.” Japanese-American soldiers did enlist, helping free more than 30,000 survivors in Dachau, but their heroic acts abroad failed to liberate some of their own families from internment camps in this nation.

Asian-Americans have always lived a conditional existence in which belonging is promised as long as we work harder at being good, hamming up acts of courtesy when we help our neighbors, internalizing any racial slights we encounter and always allowing them to go first. The model-minority myth is a lie that silences the structural economic racism Asian-Americans have endured and the intergenerational traumas our families have experienced from years of Western colonialism, wars and invasions. I hated talking about the model-minority myth because it was like being stuck in a feedback loop. After refuting that myth, I was dragged back to refute it again. But when the pandemic struck, I realized how deeply entrenched that myth was in the psyches of not only whites but other people of color.

The coronavirus at least burned away any illusions that East Asians are almost white. Since the first cases were discovered in the U.S., I kept imagining the coronavirus as an irradiating purple light lancing through the cracks of our white-supremacist world. Some of us never noticed these cracks before, but now it is all that we can see. African-Americans and Latinos are dying in higher proportions than anyone else in New York City, perhaps because of their lack of access to health care and because many of them are essential workers and can’t shelter at home. But systemic racism keeps minorities separated. White supremacy ensures that once the pressure of persecution is lifted even a little from one group, that group will then fall upon the newly targeted group out of relief and out of a frustrated misplaced rage that can never touch, let alone topple, the real enemy.

The hate hasn’t abated since Americans have been ordered to stay indoors. The Asian Pacific Policy and Planning Council said the reporting site was still receiving about 80 incidents a day, and there have been 1,600 since March 19. Because of the shelter-in-place rules, working-class Asians who are employed in essential businesses, like grocers, are not only at higher risk of being exposed to the virus but face the brunt of anti-Asian harassment. Yuh-Line Niou, a New York State assemblywoman who represents Chinatown and other areas in Lower Manhattan, said an Asian-American friend delivered food to a customer who spat right into his eye. Another friend, a nurse, was called a “dirty Chink” by her patient, who had Covid-19. “And these are the people who don’t report,” Niou said. “They’re scared of losing their jobs.”

Then on April 5, [an assailant tossed what’s believed to be acid](https://nypost.com/2020/04/06/brooklyn-woman-burned-outside-home-in-possible-acid-attack/)on a 39-year-old Asian woman in Brooklyn while she was taking out the trash, severely burning her head, neck and back. I am enraged. I am scared. In addition to fears of catching the virus or of being unemployed or of loved ones dying, we now have to worry about having acid thrown at us? It is happening everywhere. It is happening too close to home. It’s happening at home. One Asian-American family returned to their house in Minnesota and found a sign posted at their door: “We’re watching you,” the note said. “Take the Chinese virus back to China. We don’t want you here infecting us with your diseases.” It was signed, “Your friendly neighborhood.”

-Cathy Park Hong 20 (Recipient of the Windham-Campbell Prize, Guggenheim Fellowship and National Endowment for the Arts Fellowship, The Slur I Never Expected to Hear in 2020, April 26 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/12/magazine/asian-american-discrimination-coronavirus.html>)

#### This is a new age of Yellow Peril. Paranoia has been sutured to the social and political that ignites Asian violence to fuel American exceptionalism. This establishes a positive feedback loop that proliferates orientalist tropes that conflates Yellow Peril as the pathological death knell to Whiteness.

Svetlicic 20 (Marjan Svetlitic, PhD Professor Emeritus, Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, “From Red Scare to Yellow Peril; Reality and Fears of the Rise of China in a Historical Context,” Teorija in Praksa, Interdisciplinary Journal of Social Science, Vol. LVII, No. 1)

China appears to be the greatest challenge facing the world today. A strategic anxiety, the New China Scare, has surfaced. Such fears, almost rising to phobias, are not new. They have been seen regularly throughout history in various clothes whenever a power transition was underway. In more recent times, such fears started with the red scare, the fear of the rise of Bolshevism. This was followed by European fears of the USA becoming dominant in the period of reconstruction after WW2. Later, in the late 1950, following the spectacular technological rise of Japan, the Yellow Peril emerged in the USA for the second time. Today we are encountering the third Yellow Peril – even though it originally started already at the mid19th in the USA as a fear of Chinese immigrants. Following 9/11, the obsession with terrorism commenced similarly to earlier anti-communist hysteria in the country. The Trump Administration has now started a trade war with China as part of the inward-looking economic and nationalist policies of America First. An opportunity has been created to replace America’s presence in the global arena as a consequence. It is not by chance that a trade war is brewing at a time when China is celebrating 40 years of being open to the world and becoming a leader in certain technologies. What is really underway is a technology war. After China’s spectacular growth, it is now time for states to begin thinking about what this actually means to each of them, what it means to their region, and to the world generally. Trump’s trade war against China may be seen as a way of rectifying some of the deficiencies of the existing Pax Americana. It is thus high time to reflect on whether China’s growth threatens the world’s development and stability (system) or is benefiting the partner countries. The awareness that China is not only a country with a big economy, but also one that has growing military strength coupled with geo-strategic ambitions, is making a difference in both real life and theory2. World power is obviously going back to Asia. The winners will be those able to take advantage of this (Prestowitz, 2005). According to Porter, “the biggest risk is not that China will succeed in rising to become an economic superpower. The biggest risk is that it will fail” (Porter, 2005). It is hence no surprise that China is increasingly seen as a threat. Paranoia has been carved into mind-sets not only for the country’s size, but also for the different Chinese civilisation which for the Western world is a strange combination of culture, a particular type of state-controlled economy and state socialism/communism. The purpose of this article is therefore to answer two research questions. First, are these fears justifiable or overblown, with concerns being based on the differences in the roots of civilisation, on cultural fears? Second, what are these differences, if any at all, and can we detect any similarities among them? The article is structured as follows. We first look at the theoretical framework of such challenges/fears, then consider each fear in chronological order in sections 2 and 3. The fourth section seeks to identify differences/ similarities while the last sections outlines some policy-related conclusions. Theoretical Framework The article addresses the manner in which views/perceptions3 of different global challenges have evolved in recent history. Accordingly, the analysis concentrates more on qualitative data and attitudes along with the context in which they are created because, as implied by Kant’s “transcendental idealism”, it is appearances and perceptions, not the reality that truly matters. In such qualitative analysis, social psychology is becoming ever more important. It sees challenges as a positive reaction to perceived fear4, regarded as one of the basic emotions. “The culture of fear5 of the other seems to be a forceful mechanism of social and political indoctrination for human beings« (Skoll and Korstanje, 2013). It has played and continues to play a central role in driving popular fears to make the masses do, or not do, what the elite desires. Especially in the twenty-first century, described as uncertain and unpredictable, risky VUCA (vulnerability, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity), we seem to engage ever more frequently with various issues through a narrative of fear as a vital instrument of propaganda or, to borrow Bernays’ expression, engineering of consent (1969). People develop specific fears as a result of what they have learned, but the cause might also be an irrational, unconscious fear of the unknown6. Moreover, individual fears can grow into fears of a whole group or can as well arise from the fears held by a whole group usually manifested as stereotyping erroneously, of an entire nation. When problems mount in society, the specific cultural and historical context involved can fuel the stereotyping of entire nations as people look for the causes of such problems in others, in foreigners. They start to blame (scapegoat) them for job insecurity, problems with healthcare, low wages, the lack of safety nets etc. In a culture of fear, domestic frustrations are transferred to foreign enemies. A crisis is a typical example of when such prejudicial attitudes are created, although stereotypes can also be built to make it easier to process limited information and degrade others in order to magnify one’s own image. This phenomenon is more common when little is known about others or it is hard to learn about them due to being located far away (the distance factor). Such stereotypes impede our ability to objectively assess data/processes, assuming that stereotypes, presenting different picture, are believed to be true. Our readiness and ability to think critically and predict the behaviour of others is thereby weakened. All of these elements are visible in all the perils we analyse here, particularly in the yellow scares. People like to rely on stereotypes that validate their already held opinion more than trying to evaluate each situation on its own, by looking at data. They tend to select information sources that suit their ideological orientation and ignore other sources or contrary opinions. In a way, stereotypes are an instrument of excuses. After defining the role played by fear, we must examine more quantitative data to shed light on what creates such fears. Realism is the leading theory explaining sources of power as it mainly relies on material capabilities and relative economic and military power. Apart from neglecting the role of domestic beliefs, this may be its biggest shortcoming in view of the rising importance of soft power.. According to mainstream realism,7 countries compete with each other as they pursue their national interests in the struggle for power in anarchic international relations. The power of a state depends on what it is actually based on and the ways in which it is exercised. Seeking hegemony is therefore the result because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to acquire power at the expense of rivals. States are concerned with the accumulation of relative power as they will not be content with relative security by relying on other states (see Snyder, 2002). Such offensive realism can thus explain the emerging role of China as it aspires to obtain a more prominent role in international relations. On the other hand, defensive realism can explain the USA as it struggles to retain its current dominance, which is proving more important than increasing its power. To properly understand the rise of China today, it is essential to look beyond realism, to also consider the soft power8 which is growing in importance in a VUCA world. However, the capacity to influence others means possessing resources like population, land, natural resources, economy, armed forces, and political stability (Nye and Welch, 2014). Soft and hard power are not alternatives, but complements. In the words of Melissen, “the wheels of hard power can only function smoothly with the lubricant of soft power” (Ham, 2005). Lacking in soft power, China has started to intensively use soft power to complement its hard power based on six pillars: cultural attractiveness, political values, development model, international institutions, international image, and economic temptation (Li and Worm, 2010). The whole story about attitudes to the leading or aspiring global players is about power and its transition. Power transition theory is in fact a version of the power balance theory, a very popular theory of international relations that interprets the causes of conflict (Haas, 1953; Sheehan, 1996; Waltz, 1979). It stems from the hierarchical nature of international relations in which the most powerful countries define the rules of the game. As rival countries acquire power, the chances of war increase (Hillebrand, 2010: 12).9 The old powers’ resistance to the erosion of their position leads us to the second group of theories, the theory of hegemon. Hegemonic stability theory (THS) argues that an asymmetric system10 is probably more stable; if one country dominates, it is a hegemon. The hegemon dominates the rules of the game and with the help of military dominance creates certain public goods in the form of security and economic stability. The erosion of this role can therefore stifle the world system and throw its stability off balance. The smaller the difference in power between the leading and rival states, the greater the likelihood of conflict (Kugler and Organski, 1989) with the upcoming forces because the incumbent power is unwilling to leave its prime position11; the so-called Thucydides trap12 (Allison, 2017). “But it doesn’t have to be« (ibid. 2017) Allison adds, although Kugler (2006) believes that China’s growing power over the USA is greatly increasing the chances of war in the next few decades. Emmott states “that the USA should not fear falling into a Thucydides trap because the historical analogy of England, Germany and WW2 is dissimilar to East Asia today. Germany overtook Britain in the 1900s, while China will not overtake the US for decades” (Emmott, 2009). According to China’s plans, this could happen upon the 100-year anniversary of their country in 2049. However, China is still far from closing the gap on all sources of power and thus the chances of war are lower. The power transition is not simply a political, geopolitical or economic problem, but a psychological one. The leading nations pride is hurt13 and it therefore attempts to block the emergence of any new power(s). The third group of relevant theories deals with different civilisation models since views are firmly embedded in the culture of the observer. Ethnocentrism is a worldview that regards Western culture and way of thinking as something extraordinary, placing it in the centre of the world14. Other cultures are viewed as different, backward, despotic-undemocratic, sometimes even barbaric or racist. It is assumed that the entire world should be modelled on Western values that are seen as universal, always correct, while others are uncivilised barbarians (see Plummer, 2010: 214). “It is about understanding the ideas and practices of another culture with the criteria of our own” (Giddens, 1997). Eurocentrism has been built on an ethnocentric ideological construct approach, locating Europe in the world’s epicentre. It interprets the history of the world as its own history. One’s identity develops on the basis of difference from others, difference in the degree of rationality; we are rational and others are irrational. The only possible conclusion is – European civilisation is superior. According to Amin, this is the ideology of the modern capitalist world (2009). Mastnak sees in Eurocentrism “a colonialist worldview, an inspiration for the European conquest and subjugation of the world and the justification of that conquest and rule” (Južnič, 2009: 183–184). The recently developed ethno-nationalism, manifested in populism and every country first policies has its roots in such theories. It also gives rise to orientalism as a view of the Middle East and, more broadly, of Eastern civilisations (Said, 1996). The mythology of enemies other than us is attributed to “sub- or inhuman ethnic and racial traits”. It is not about attitudes to individuals, but about a group of people who, as a last resort, have evil purposes attributed to them (conspiracy theory) in the sense of good versus bad. The responsibility for our own problems is shifted over to strangers (the ideology of economic nationalism), often expanding into overt populist-tinged chauvinism/racism and xenophobia. Refugees/migrants are increasingly the scapegoats for the ever worse position of those affected by technical progress and globalization (GLO), together with rising imports from China15. The populist revolt against the enormous upsurge in Chinese exports which, on top of the GLO, is seen as the biggest culprit for the lost jobs and deindustrialisation of the West. Inglehart and Norris contend this revolt is largely based on cultural, not economic factors (see Freund et al. 2017). Trump’s protectionism is also motivated by the incorrect assumption that China is to blame for the large US trade deficit.16 A chronology of fears The Red Scare The very first red scare in the USA came after the Paris Commune of 1871 while the second one followed the October Bolshevik revolution in Russia. It centred on the perceived threat of the American labour movement, anarchist revolution and political radicalism. The Third Red Scare came directly after WW2, fuelled at home by the perception of national or foreign communists infiltrating or subverting American society and, as the external factor, by the Soviet Union’s growing role in the world. A new bogeyman, ‘The Red Menace’, was portrayed as being everywhere. Communists were demonised. The Red Scare reached its peak between 1950 and 1954 during ‘McCarthyism’. The pursuit of allegedly communist infiltrators in American society had begun. Domestic communism was seen an enemy of apocalyptic proportions. When the Soviets developed an atomic bomb, fear levels intensified, just like during the Cuban crisis or when in 1957 the Soviets sent “Lajka” the dog into space on Sputnik 1. American pride was wounded then like it is now, faced with a decline in its global leadership. As a rule, such fears manifest as various conspiracy theories to make them become more tangible and more persuasive from the point of view of their generators. After the transition, Russia’s role in the world has been shrinking. Further, like all autocratic regimes, Russia should eventually transition to a marketdriven democracy (Ikenberry, 2014) meaning that it is less of a concern. Nevertheless, fear of Russia is again on the rise, mainly based on deep distrust and value-based concerns. Putin has spoken of the “offensive mistrust of the West about Russia” (Petrič, 2018: 471). American Challenge; Europe The demolished Europe, wrote J. J. Servain-Schreiber in his bestseller (1967/69), is under threat from the Americans. The USA was pictured as “enslaving” Europe, becoming an economic colony based on massive inflows of American investment funds. He believed that Europe, lagging behind the USA on all fronts (management, technology, research) was in a silent economic war. He spoke of “American attackers” in the form of US multinational companies, about the collapse of Europe. Yet Schreiber did not stop just with describing the situation. He helped revive French nationalism (similar to today’s populist movements). Later, he taught at Carnegie Mellon University (Pittsburgh, 1984–1995) and became chairman of Le Center Mondial in Paris that promoted the development of computer and information technologies. In 1985, he told President Mitterrand he was resigning because the French government had wanted to procure French equipment for France’s schools instead of buying the computers from an American corporation (see Rubner, 1990: 272). Schreiber’s intellectual honesty and consistency may thus be questioned. To conclude, these fears were also overblown. Yellow Peril I The Yellow Peril has seen two waves in the USA. The First Peril was directed against Chinese workers at the end of the 1880s. Rather than addressing the economic aspect of immigration, in 1882 anti-Asian propaganda encouraged the federal government to pass the Chinese Exclusion Act, making the immigration of Chinese labourers to the USA unlawful and preventing them from obtaining citizenship. Although this Act was repealed in 1943, anti-Asian sentiment/propaganda remained strong in the country. Later, following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, it was directed at Japanese-Americans, portrayed in ways very similar to the 19th century Chinese immigrants. Yellow Peril propaganda was based on the supposedly lower intelligence or subhuman qualities of Japanese people (see White, 2019). Yellow Peril II; Japan The second wave of the Yellow Peril came in 1960 during the Japanese miracle (10.5% average GDP growth in 1950–1973). Japan’s share of world GDP had risen from 2–3 percent to 10 percent. The Japanese miracle was largely due to the creative imitation of Western technology and introduction of new production methods (lean production). Schreiber (1980) was fascinated by Japan’s automotive industry and automation, robotisation and computer science. This miracle was initially facilitated by the possibility of directing all its resources for development (Japan was not allowed to spend on the army). Second, it was due to the inventiveness and working habits of the Japanese people and the systematic strategic trade and industrial policy. The Japanese began to buy property in Manhattan and acquired American ‘jewels’ (like Rockefeller Center in Manhattan, Firestone Tire and Rubber, Columbia Pictures or the Pebble Beach Golf Course). It was predicted that Japan might already overtake the USA by GDP pc in 1985. Not surprisingly, Vogel (1979) wrote the book: Japan as Number One. This fear indeed had both economic and cultural roots given that American pride and self-confidence had been dented. The Japanese had taken the lead in sectors previously the cause of American pride (automotive industry). Still, such fears again proved to be overblown since Japan’s yellow miracle was followed by very low growth and then by the lost century. Imitation can obviously be a double-edged sword; those imitated feel threatened, while simultaneously, by wanting to have what the imitated have, the imitators themselves begin to be troubled by doubts and lose their self-respect. The French philosopher Girard says this leads to hostilities and a feeling of being endangered. Yellow Peril III: China’s Contemporary Challenge Today’s yellow peril concerns the big challenge China brings to the whole international system after its spectacular rise in the last 40 years. In less than 30 years, China had become the world’s second-largest economy by 2001. The first signs of the modern fear of China emerged in December 2004, the last month in which The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) remained in force but was set to expire by the end of the year under a World Trade Organization (WTO) decision. Developed countries soon barricaded themselves off from China and the threat of becoming flooded with its textile products. The challenge with China is underpinned by the size of its economy and by it rivalling the USA as the dominant power. China is already the world’s largest economy in population and trade-volume terms. Nominally, in 2017 China’s GDP amounted to 64 percent of US GDP. In 2014, it overtook the USA in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) to become the world’s biggest economy (Bergsten, 2018, 2). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that China will overtake the US (at 2017 market rates) in 2030 (IMF, 2018). Yet, according to the index of economic strength, China still lags 12.3 percent behind the USA. Still, as early as 2030 it may become the leading economic power, holding an 18% share while that of the USA is projected to fall (1973–2030) from 16.3 percent to 10.2 percent (Subramanian, 2011). These economic indicators should be stressed because there is a strong long-term correlation between economic capability, military power and a country’s position in the global power system. “Therefore, the hegemon (either US or China) will be in a weaker position than before /… /. It should be though remembered that, historically, China’s leading role is a natural position, since China lost its leading position by Britain only in the 19th century, and after the WW2, when US has taken over from the latter” (van Bergeijk, 2018: 15). One of the more controversial economic accusations and economic fears underlying the challenge posed by China is that it systematically imitates17 and ‘steals’ intellectual property (IP)18 and forces foreign companies to transfer their technology to Chinese companies. Imitation is partly the result of admiration and resistance to Western ideas following the Century of Humiliation, the “Opium war which marked the beginning of China’s collapse and dismemberment at the hands of foreign powers” (see Davis and Rašković, 2017: 8). A fundamental goal of contemporary Chinese politics is to do all that is needed to ensure this never happens again. It nevertheless seems that this accusation is overblown. Namely, in the latest US-China Business Council Member Survey, just 5 percent of respondents reported having been asked to transfer technology to China, and this concern was ranked 24 out of the top 27 challenges facing foreign companies (Huang and Smith, 2019). At the same time, certain problematic imitation activities (trade, foreign investment, licensing, international research collaboration, reverse engineering) are legitimate and voluntary. Moreover, the situation in the area of IP rights is now changing. Premier Li Keqiang stated that “strengthening IP protection is strategic and vital for strengthening the socialist market economy” (Reuters, 2017). In view of the ambitious plans to transform China from a “large manufacturing country” into a “powerful manufacturing country” by 2025 and a “leading global producer” by 2049 (“Made in China” and plans for the PRC’s 100th anniversary in 2049), it may be expected that China will become a leader in many technology-driven activities. Simultaneously, the country seeks to strengthen the protection of IP not so much due to external pressures but under the internal pressure of its own companies that desire greater protection for their patents. The more domestic firms become innovative, the more they are seeking to protect their IP rights19. China is a global leader in technologies such as e-commerce, artificial intelligence, fintech, high-speed trains, renewable energy, and electric cars. Companies like Alibaba, Didi Chuxing, Huawei and Tencent are operating at the global technology frontier (World Bank, 2019: xvii). The third economic fear relates to the huge rise of Chinese investments, especially their acquisition of technology-leading companies (Godement et al., 2017). This opens the door not only to economic but political influence and creates potential for the Chinese ‘divide and rule’ policy. Public opinion is becoming more hostile (Grant and Barysch, 2008) but oscillating between “China saving Europe” and “China taking over Europe” (Shambaugh, 2013). The world fears the transfer of Chinese management patterns or values wherever their companies make investments. Past experience shows evidence of both implications; strong adaptations to local cultures (particularly in industrial countries) but also the imposition of its own management style and working habits (Africa) or a combination of these two strategies, a kind of Yin-Yang cultural approach treating different countries/firms/people differently. The EU is encountering China’s ever more aggressive policy of influencing more flexible and less critical positions in China (market economy status, democracy). The 17+1 initiative is such a strategy that could create splits within the EU, making some members the ‘fifth column’ of China in the EU. It is thus little wonder that alarm bells have started ringing over China’s ability to translate its economic power into attempts to undermine Europe’s unified policy on China. Apart from hard economic data, soft power factors should also be considered. Here, China’s position is still weak despite all the efforts it has been making in public diplomacy recently. Chinese public diplomacy these days is replacing the previous “charm offensive” strategy (Kurlantzick, 2007: 6) aimed at neutralising the “theory of threats” and improving China’s global reputation (Tai-Ting Liu, Tony, 2019: 77). The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) may also be regarded as an instrument of soft power. Today’s paranoia, in the face of a rapidly growing and increasingly ambitious China, is obviously principally rooted in the enormity of the Chinese economy. Second, a fear of its difference, exotics, is entailed; third, of its leading role in the world and, finally, the fear of economic intelligence, of espionage, as a threat to security. “In the name of national security, America is treating Chinese students and scholars as a new ‘yellow peril’, in a witch-hunt worthy of Senator Joseph McCarthy” (The Economist, 2019, 13 July: 52). The fear of the difference is merging with the fear of potential political interference in the economy via the large share of state-controlled firms20. The biggest distinction is therefore that China is a different civilisation, a communist, centralised and authoritarian state. It has different values and religious beliefs. The challenge brought by Chinese is thus different. Three potential scenarios arise. First, that China’s position will start to be eroded if it becomes unable to cope with the accumulated problems of its own rapid growth and the fact it has not anticipated the accompanying problems21, including all the political challenges, the necessary democratisation of the political system, and providing more human rights in the long run22. China will encounter Rodrik’s trilemma (2011) regarding how to accommodate its three pillars: GLO, sovereignty and democracy23. This scenario entails considerable internal instability and negative implications for world stability, clearly not in the interest of any of us. An international implication of such a stagnant scenario might be China adopting a more aggressive foreign policy aimed at maintaining support at home while ratcheting up repression against any signs of dissent at home. A more likely scenario is that China will take on a leading role in many areas, especially the economy, thereby beginning to change the world’s structure in either the direction of Pax Sinica or a multilateral system with China as one of the leading powers (the third scenario) in a world of cooperation and competition among the great powers. The question is whether China wishes to abolish the capitalist world order or to simply form a nonhegemonic capitalist world order in which it will have more opportunities for development. According to Hočevar (2019, 15), it seems more that “China does not undermine the capitalist world order, but rather tries to challenge the US position in the existing capitalist world order in order to form a non-hegemonistic capitalist world order”. He may be right for now, but the situation could change when China achieves a more hegemonistic position. History shows that power corrupts and aspirations can, along the way, be broadened, such as to shape the world so as to better suit its own (ideological) design (albeit the changes will be gradual). Economic success is namely enhancing China’s self-confidence, courage and opportunities to exercise its interests. It appears obvious that the US hegemony will come to an end, thereby jeopardising the stability of the system in line with the theory of hegemonic stability. The erosion of this role could thus endanger the existing global system’s functioning, throwing its stability off balance. Differences and similarities in the above perils Is there a common denominator to these fears, eclipsing popular apocalyptic literature, about dangerous aliens threatening our world, or are they more idiosyncratic? Both are correct; there are similarities and differences. Four of the most obvious similarities are as follows. The first is the fear of the growing economic size of the challengers while the second is the fear of external threats, of dangerous aliens that endanger our white world mostly because they are different and not so much because they are economically or technologically threatening. Economic concerns have gradually turned into more ideological, cultural, religious, civilisational or even racist fears. They appear as mythology regarding an enemy, someone that threatens us because they are different, which is not ours. The third group relates to the second but is ideologically based (red and yellow scare III) and the last one relates to the changing international context. The first type of fear (growing economic power) primarily relates to the American challenge to Europe after WW2, and today’s China threat also manifested in Trump’s America First policy. The Japanese yellow peril in the 1960/1970s was also economically based, but dissimilar in that the Japanese are culturally different. Among the analysed economic challenges, the biggest quantitative difference is the size and geostrategic role/ambition. Japan’s challenge in the 1970s was confined to economic/technological power (Japan’s GDP was 9 times smaller than that of the USA, whereas China’s GDP today is already 70% of US GDP). The specifics of the Chinese challenge these days, compared to the one posed by Japan, is that such economic strength is ever more combined with military and geostrategic ambitions to become the leading country in the region and (more implicitly than explicitly) in the world. The challenge China provides today is quantitatively only comparable to that of the USA when challenging Europe in the aftermath of WW2. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union also competed with the USA chiefly in the ideological, military and space technology fields, but was never a serious global economic or commercial contender24. The challenge posed by China is unlike the American, red scare and Japanese challenge. China’s size is unrivalled by Russia or Japan. The Chinese shock has affected those who were already struggling to keep their jobs for other reasons while in Japan’s case US industry was better prepared (the context factor). It is also unlike them because China’s growth is extremely important for the global economy, whereas the relative consequences for the world brought by all other challengers would be significantly weaker. The challenge of China also has a geopolitical dimension in that it is becoming a military force and, in contrast to Japan, it is not an ally. China is the only military and economic rival of the USA and is hence creating a fundamental shift in the global distribution of power and influence (Geeraerts, 2013: 6). Based on detailed historical analysis, Subramanian notes that China’s dominance is more imminent than usually believed, will be more broadly based (covering wealth, trade, external finance, and currency), and could be as large in magnitude in the next 20 years as that of the UK in the halcyon days of the Empire or of the USA in the aftermath of World War II (2011: 4). Yet, the ‘China challenge’ has some similarities with the red one. They both used to have not only economic but also ideological roots, although the Soviet Union wanted to export socialism and China is expanding more through its economic and less through its ideological power. The second group refers to culturally-based, ideological fears, the threat of those who are exotic, because we do not know or understand them and they are ideologically different. We therefore feel threatened (USSR/Russia and China). In 1993, P. Kennedy stated that “Protectionism, anti-immigrant policies, blocking new technologies, and finding new enemies to replace Cold War foes are common reactions at a time of jolts and jars and smashes in the social life of humanity”, a view that can be applied to the current situation. Fear of this group can also be explained theoretically by the hegemonic stability and power transition theory, and eurocentrism. The third group of differences is political/ideological. While the USA, Japan and Europe share Western democratic values, China is an authoritarian socialist state, just like the Soviet Union was when it challenged the USA. However, China does not export its ideology as much as the Soviet Union did, but is first and foremost pursuing its global economic interests. By doing so, it can also indirectly pursue its ideology by spreading its soft power25 and ‘sharp power’26; for instance, by making the beneficiary states in the BRI financially dependent when they are unable to repay the large loans received for infrastructural projects within this framework (debt trap diplomacy)27. The fourth distinct factor is the changed circumstances in the world after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War and, up until recently, the strengthening of multilateralism, galloping globalisation (and de-globalisation of late), growing interdependencies and digitalisation. This is a special kind oligopolistic multilateralism, a blend of cooperation and competition between the major players that today are highly interconnected within a network of global cooperation. This power transition is occurring in a different environment, suggesting that a new cold war scenario is not very likely. Apart from the differences in all of the mentioned challenges, there are some similarities. Basically, all of the said fears: a. were based on quantitative/size factors, the rapid growth of the economies, their political and military power challenging the current system and the world hegemony, b. proved to be overblown, too dramatic, provoking paranoid panic overreactions. But nothing gets eaten as hot as it gets cooked, c. were based on ideological cultural roots, including racial, even racist prejudices28, on ethnocentrism, generating suspicions leading to eroded trust, d. were often misused for internal political battles (McCarthyism in the USA or today’s populism) and draw attention to the need to make changes in the global system’s structure and functioning and to adapt to such tectonic movements in advance, not after the event, to the transition of power underway in the global system. These fears have also caused a rethinking of certain theoretical postulates about international trade/ relations and development theories generally. This is the positive role of such fears. China is clearly the biggest challenge in the modern world. Yet, fears of a yellow peril are not new, although the forms and contexts are different, confirming Hegel when he said that history repeats itself the first time as a tragedy29 and the second time as a farce30 (Marx’s addition). These phenomena started with a red scare, the fear of the rise of Bolshevism and later the Soviet Union (now Russia) after World War II and European fears of the USA becoming dominant in the period of its post WW2 reconstruction and later the fear of Japan’s spectacular technological rise. The article has described the substantial differences and similarities that exist among the challengers due to their size, political systems, ideological basis, military strength and geopolitical ambitions, and the context. The explanatory power of the different theories varies according to individual challengers; somewhere along the line, the greatest weight was given to the realist school and power transition theory based on economic/quantitative factors as a basis for their power (Japan, USA, China), or ideological/ military factors (in the case of the Soviet Union/Russia), while elsewhere they are again more ethnocentric (Japan, China). This makes a multidisciplinary approach essential because a single discipline is unable to explain such tectonic changes and ensuing reactions. All of the mentioned fears were significantly overblown by linearly extrapolating tendencies into the future, without taking account of the historical context or other factors that hampered such linear forecasts. They were conceptualised within a ‘zero-sum’ game where the rise of one power leads to the decline of another, causing inevitable conflict with the leading one and amounting to a challenge and threat to the traditional Western-led international order. Kupchan also seems right when claiming, »that the ability of great powers to impose their preferences will only decline further in the future.… The twenty-first century will not be America’s, China’s, Asia’s, or anyone else’s. It will belong to no one«. The USA will no longer be the hegemon it once was. The transformed international system should, using Rodrik words, leave greater “policy space” for national policies and sovereignty. If the great powers act wisely, neither Pax China nor Chimerica or G2 will emerge, but a multilaterally governed world in the interest of all, not just a few. This is viable if China follows, as proposed by Colonel Liu Mingfu, the example of the USA after the experience of the UK which quietly left the lead role to the USA after WW2, and not the Soviet Union example which directly clashed with the USA during the Cold War. He advocates a tolerant, long-term strategy, a century marathon31 (see Miller, 2018). In this manner, war can be side-stepped and a new model of great-power relations developed, avoiding confrontation with the USA. It seems the Beijing Consensus is unlikely to substitute the Washington Consensus in the foreseeable future. However, it holds the potential to influence countries’ development strategies. The near future will not be the same as the last century with one country leading. There could be power sharing between China, the USA, Europe/EU32 and Russia (perhaps also India) within the spirit of a ‘collaborative autonomy’ logic. Europe is not militarily strong enough but has an advantage in terms of its soft power. According to B. Emmott (2006), while China is likely to emerge as the most powerful player, it will not be sufficiently powerful to dominate but strong enough to be significant shaper of the world order. He compares China with Britain in the early 19th century when despite being more powerful it was unable to dominate. It remains unclear whether China wants superpower status. It seems that China is aware of the danger of a strategic overstretch (paraphrasing Kennedy, 1987), as an imbalance between its strategic commitments and its economic base, although it is not immune from triumphalism after abandoning Deng Xiaoping’s low-profile approach of making China great again.

#### The debate community avoids discussing Anti-Asian racism like the plague…

#### Asian debaters are expected to assume a restrained and calm ethos in round because their emotions are pathologized. When docility is expected, deviant behavior gets marked as too aggressive or unprofessional.

#### China has been a major part of each college resolution for the past three years, but people still can’t pronounce President Xi. Those are the same people who are the first to dock speaker points from Asian debaters for vocal inflections, tonal shifts, and accents that dance past white ears. Furthermore, every core neg argument the past four years outlined in topic papers have included iterations of Chinese deterrence that demonstrate a consistent and desired effort to make Sinophobia a stable and predictable research item.

#### As a communicative activity, debate must be held accountable for implicit, and asymmetric rhetorical protocols that maintain orientalist logics that predetermine what conversations are noted as valuable.

#### Thus, vote neg for the affirmation of transnational Asian praxis. Movements are growing and connecting at a greater rate than ever for anticolonial futures. The conglomeration of COVID, accelerating racial violence, and economic inequality put us in a unique position to break away from norms that have brought us to this present crisis. The only question is if you’re willing to not fear contamination by reaching out and grasping for a new and better future in this round.

Liu 20 (Wen, Assistant Professor of women’s gender and sexuality studies at the University of Albany, “Internationalism Beyond the ‘Yellow Peril’: On the Possibility of Transnational Asian American Solidarity,” 2020, UC Santa Barbara Journal of Transnational American Studies)

In the midst of a global pandemic and social upheavals, how will transnational Asian–Black solidarity take shape? Currently living in Taipei, Taiwan, I am involved in an emergent circle of diasporic Asian radicals who write and organize around the vibrant left-leaning movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong and seek to build international solidarity based on a critique of both US and Chinese imperialism. This new activist milieu that has been described as “transnationally Asian”5 not only rejects Asian American assimilationist politics and the narrow focus of liberal international politics around democracy and human rights, but also actively seeks cross-national and cross-racial points of racial encounters and challenges the orthodox Western leftist takes on social movements that often defer to a reductionist binarism of “capitalism versus communism.” For example, a Hong Kong activist was excluded from participating in a BLM solidarity event hosted by the Sunrise Movement, an American youth–led climate organization, due to some US leftists’ Twitter commentaries that misrepresented Hong Kong’s protests against Beijing’s increasingly harsh conditions of authoritarian control as being funded by the US military. Writers from Lausan, a leftist Hong Kong press, have condemned such mischaracterization of Hong Kong’s ongoing mass movement as merely manipulated by US imperialism and, instead, insisted on the importance of building alliances between Hong Kong’s struggle against authoritarianism and BLM’s vision of police abolition.6 From this single case, one can understand that building transnational solidarity is complex and arduous work, both conceptually and practically. It requires us to maneuver from one ideological trap to another across geopolitical contexts and locally specific historical conditions. While transnational iteration is emancipatory and necessary to achieve a genuine form of Asian–Black solidarity, it must be built on a bidirectional and bifocal analysis instead of merely relying on the US-centric epistemology of what constitutes leftist politics. By seeking transnationalism from the West toward the non-West and not vice versa, it’s easy to fall into the logic of Western “China apologists” or neo-Cold War logic, dismissing the interasian conflicts that also have global ramifications. To put it in another way, as China criminalizes Hong Kong’s fight for fundamental democratic rights and implements mass arrests of young activists under the National Security Laws,7 a progressive Asian American politics must not only be focused on racial relations domestically but challenge multiple forms of Empire beyond the borders of the US. Only through this multidimensional transnational praxis can we begin to see the underlying mechanisms that allow BLM activists from Minneapolis to Seattle to adopt Hong Kong protesters’ strategies against the police. 8 These possibilities for alliance among “transnationally Asian” activists include protesters in Hong Kong and the US using umbrellas and tennis rackets to protect themselves from tear gas, the joint coalition between Taiwanese indigenous organizations and Black Lives Matter Taiwan calling out racism,9 and Singaporeans debating whether to topple their colonial monuments.10 Our current shared struggles against the rapid right-wing turn of global hegemonies do not draw lines between the simple binaries of “East vs. West,” “white vs. Black,” or “authoritarianism vs. democracy,” but underscore the interconnected fights against the militarized police state, neoliberal capitalist order, Han supremacy, and the continued impacts of Euro-American coloniality. The “yellow peril” may have been a useful metaphor describing the shared racialization of the Asian body against white supremacy and US imperialism; the politics of internationalism in the present conditions requires a much more nuanced analysis of interregional geopolitics across the transpacific. The possibility of transnational Asian American solidarity must be situated beyond the framework of “one united race against one empire.” Indeed, the fast growing infection and mortality rates of Covid-19 show that the virus cannot be simply contained by national borders, and our racial critique must also be extended transnationally. When a disease is racialized, it not only exposes the racial inequalities built in the global public health infrastructures but also how mechanisms of national security require the domination of subjects who are deemed to be “outsiders.” Rather than falling into a nationalistic blame game based on the Cold War logic—choosing sides between one empire (the US) and another (China)—the pandemic requires us to engage in the racial justice and antinativist struggles in our different localities as well as hold one another’s movements accountable to an internationalist vision of collective survival.

### 2

#### Specifically, settler colonialism studies has been monopolized by white scholars – paving over native grammars with intelligible concepts of land, sovereignty, and dispossession is discursive genocide – erases attempts of Native and Black studies to reconcile over the language of genocide

King 19 (Tiffany Lethabo King, Assistant Professor of Women's, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State University, “The Black Shoals: The Offshore Formation of Black and Native Studies”, <https://read-dukeupress-edu.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/books/book/2617/The-Black-ShoalsOffshore-Formations-of-Black-and//af>)

Before settler colonialism was established as a field of study, around 2005–2006, robust yet imperfect discussions were occurring between Black and Indigenous communities.87 These partial and evolving conversations relied on literature emerging from Native studies and Black diaspora studies.88 While I do not want to suggest that these texts are sufficient in and of themselves or that the work being done in settler colonial studies is without value, **I do want to critically scrutinize how settler colonial studies has become the preferred discourse for examining Indigeneity, relations to land and space, and questions of sovereignty.** Why was Native studies usurped and abandoned as the disciplinary lens from which to pursue these questions? Why is Black studies an unlikely place to pursue notions of sovereignty and nation (or the impossibility of sovereignty and nation)? What can be made from shared Native and Black discursive and extradiscursive moments? Unlike White settler colonial studies, Black studies (particularly Afropessimism) and Native studies sustain a steadfast focus on abolishing genocide and avoid reflexive analogies and detours through humanist modes of thought and expression. Further, **settler colonial studies invisibilizes historical and ongoing discussions between Black and Indigenous communities and Black and Native studies**.89 Within existing White settler colonial discourses the extended elucidation of the settler and their concerns interrupts examination of the violence of the slave trader and serial murderer of Indigenous peoples. In the book The Empire Writes Back (2002), Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin include a (very) small section that focuses on settler colonies and their literature. In their examination of literary production in settler colonies, the colonized subject is imagined as the White subject writing back to and resisting the colonial power of the metropole.90 Almost no Indigenous literature is mentioned as a form of anticolonial discourse.91 In a very short section, the authors define settler literature as White settlers’ attempts to distinguish themselves through language and writing from Britain as the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. This method became the frame for thinking about postcolonial thought in the settler colonies. However, The Empire Writes Back attends to literary forms and thus does not anticipate the consolidation of settler colonial studies as a specialized field of critical theory. It was too early for the authors to comment on the “settler colonial turn” that was about to take form. However, their focus on White literary cultural production forecasts who would be centered in the emerging discourse of settler colonial studies.92 The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century marked a moment in which women of color scholarship and activism were growing in popularity. Within the academy and social justice organizing, the rubric of violence unified a number of constituents nationally and globally. Organizing against interpersonal and state-sanctioned violence became the suture that connected an international movement of gender, prison abolition, anti-imperial, and anticolonial activists. The World Trade Organization protests, post-9/11 immigrant rights organizing, reproductive justice work, and the 2000 protests of the stolen U.S. presidential election were animated to some extent by the antiviolence movement led by women of color. At the epicenter of this organizing, the enigmatic Andrea Smith emerged as one of the antiviolence movement’s most prominent faces.93 Prominent Indigenous activists and scholars—such as Madonna Thunder Hawk, Stormy Ogden, Winona La Duke, and Sandy Grande—and their theories of violence became flash points of a movement that centered the ways that imperial and colonial violence continue to perpetuate themselves in multiple forms across the globe. Largely due to the increased attention that women-of-color coalitional work, along with Smith’s and Native women’s scholarship, was receiving, Native feminist thought began to circulate widely and garner U.S. and international acclaim. The theoretical and discursive axis in the academy—American, Ethnic, Women’s, and Gender studies—and in activist circles tilted and rotated around the body of scholarship being produced by Native and women of color in the United States. Texts such as The Sacred Hoop, From a Native Daughter, Inventing the Savage, Red Pedagogy, Conquest, and The Color of Violence, which elaborated on colonization’s connection to other forms of racialized and gendered violence, were the major sources consulted for theorizing the historical and contemporary violence of coloniality in the overlapping scholar-activist circles in the early twenty-first century.94 On the heels of the popularity of feminist texts by women of color and Native women, the scholarship of White scholars in White settler states began to gain traction and currency as a countercurrent.95 The late Patrick Wolfe’s book Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology was published in 1998, and his essay “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native” (2006) was often the text circulated first and most widely. The essay recycled the book’s statement that “invasion is a structure, not an event,” which would be quoted and cited widely over the next five to six years and into the present.96 Wolfe’s Foucauldian-influenced theorization (both structuralist and poststructuralist) of settler colonialism as a structure (diffuse, omnidirectional, and productive) appeared to have inspired a reanimation of White scholarship on processes of settlement, subject formation, land theft, and colonization in the settler states of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. In 2010, Cavanagh and Veracini announced on their blog the need for, and emergence of, a new field of study devoted to settler colonialism as a unique and irreducible form of domination.97 **According to the origin story that settler colonial studies tells about itself, the body of knowledge that marks it as a distinct area of studies emerges in the 1990s, primarily out of Australian settler scholarship**. As an area of studies, it regards settler colonialism as a “distinct social, cultural and historical formation with ongoing political effects.”98 Its genesis is indebted to the intellectual labor of the Australian scholars Wolfe, Cavanagh, and Veracini. In 2010–11, Settler Colonial Studies launched its debut issue. With an open-access journal, the field has the infrastructure and capacity to travel transnationally and gain appeal. As a transnational theoretical movement, it travels from Australia and New Zealand to Canada, South Africa, the United States, and other imperial European sites. Wolfe is regarded as the seminal figure in the field and continues to in fluence the burgeoning North American field of settler colonial studies. While scholars in Native studies do acknowledge the explicit attempts that Wolfe made to develop the analytics of settler colonialism in relation to “Indigenous thinking and scholarship that exists far longer than settler nations,” **his work has been used in ways that often end up consolidating settler colonial studies as a White field that displaces Native and Indigenous studies**.99 In 2006, Wolfe made the compelling case that settler colonialism was a more appropriate theoretical frame and structure from which to think about power in settler states. He argued that settler colonialism is larger than genocide and is the best way to conceptualize the elimination of the Native in settler societies. As I mentioned, Wolfe theorized settler colonialism as a “structure” rather than an “event.”100 As a structure, settler colonialism is an ongoing process that can contain other formations; thus, settler colonialism—and its logic of elimination—looms much larger than genocide. Wolfe proclaimed, “To this extent, it is a larger category than genocide.”101 Using a similar logic, my project argues that conquest is a larger conceptual and material terrain than settler colonialism and far more suited for the regional/hemispheric particularities of coloniality in the Americas. As the unique (and productive) social and theoretical concerns of oceanic settler-Indigenous relations traveled transnationally and landed in North America, some of the particular historical legacies and contemporaneous machinations of relations of conquest were effaced and disappeared. **The uncritical adoption of settler colonial discourses from an oceanic context enacts a discursive shift that privileges a theoretical and ethical engagement with settlers, settlement, and settler colonial relations**. Together, **this works to displace conversations about genocide, slavery, and the violent project of making the human** (humanism). In 2011, in a series of posts that ran through 2017, the Lenape scholar Joanne Barker tried to slow the rapidly moving tide of White settler colonial studies by posting a set of provocations that exposed the limits of the analytic of settler colonialism. In “Why Settler Colonialism Isn’t Exactly Right” on her Tequila Sovereign blog, Barker expresses concern with the etymology of “settlement” and what it connotes and calls forth as a form of political discourse.102 She is disturbed by how the term “settle” refers to actions such as reconciling and “making friends.” More specifically, the term connotes and encourages a “reconciling of these histories”—of White imperial violence and indigenous death and subjugation—“within the current structure and social formation of the nation-state.”103 Barker contends that settler colonialism does not capture “the current structure or social formation of the U.S.”104 In fact, Barker prefers to hold on to “harsher terms” such as imperialism and colonialism because they facilitate a more precise understanding of current militarized violence and support people who are strategizing for “empowerment and revolution.”105 Barker sustained and nuanced this analysis, and even engaged in a dialogue with Wolfe and Mark Rifkin in the spring of 2011, over the course of nine blog posts. In 2017, Barker levied another critique of the field for its structuralist rigidity and inadvertent erasure of Black people. In the post “The Analytic Constraints of Settler Colonialism,” she works through “a certain analytic within the studies [that] has, however unwittingly, foreclosed and even chilled understandings of Black and Indigenous histories and identities in ways that derail our understandings of U.S. imperialism as a social formation and so our work with one another.”106 Because settler colonial studies—and, more specifically, Wolfe’s formulation of invasion as a structure—performs like a “Marxist structuralist” problem for thought, it “rearticulates the problematics of structuralism. It treats society as a fixed, coherent thing that can be objectively described.”107 As a fixed and coherent “thing,” the settler state and its structure of invasion are states to negotiate, reconcile with, and reform rather than abolish. Further, due to the structuralist limitations of the discourse of settler colonialism, Barker struggles to think about or situate movements such as #BlackLivesMatter, #SayHerName, #NoDAPL, and #MMIW as contemporary oppositional politics that could be in coalition with one another under a settler colonial regime. More important, she is concerned about the political implications of a settler colonial studies whose decolonial imaginary renders “reparations” and “return” antithetical political objectives without merit.108 **Informed by a Black studies perspective that continues to be in conversation with Indigenous studies and people, I contend that the danger of the hegemonic hold White settler colonial studies has on the imagination of critical theory is that it actively disavows quotidian forms of anti-Black and anti-Indigenous violence and resurrects the violence of liberal humanism, even as it engages post-Enlightenment thought and poststructuralist critique**. **The field of White settler colonial studies has yet to truly reckon with the ways that it erases Indigenous knowledge and forms of Indigenous politics of decolonization that require the end of the U.S. and Canadian nation-states as well as the end of Whiteness and the versions of the human that sustain them.** The prominence of Settler colonial studies itself as a key analytical turn in the social sciences and humanities performs a form of genocidal violence as it displaces Indigenous and Native studies. **Also, the field reproduces a rigid settler-Indigenous binary that erases Black people and anti-Black violence from its analytical frames**. When the field attempts to insert Blackness through an applied intersectional rhetoric of inclusion, it makes this “structural adjustment” by incorporating Black people into the analytic as settler-laborers.109 This misnaming of Black people as both settlers and laborers occurs in part because of the field’s reliance on liberal humanist conceptual and theoretical frames inherited from continental theory. Finally, the focus of settler colonial studies on the human rubrics and idioms of land and labor invisibilizes Black political attention and focus on murder, Black fungibility, and the call for the abolition of the deadly terms on which the human and the world were crafted.

#### Debate replicates the actions of academia via the misrecognition of genocide as “settlement” and native thought as “land-centered pedagogy” is mimicked by non-native usurpation of natives in debate as “give back the land” which pushes native debaters to identify themselves at the site of coherent intra-human conflict.

Brough 17 (Taylor, BA from University of Vermont and 2016 CEDA Nationals Champion, Open letter to non-Black Native people in debate, <https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/> //af)

I should start by saying that I think Frank Wilderson is right about the position of Native people in the US racial schema. In Red, White, and Black, he argues compellingly that Native people are situated in a liminal space between life and death—that we are haunted by the dual specters of sovereignty and genocide; that our demands occur simultaneously in a coherent register of land repatriation, land theft, and treaty rights and in an incoherent register of an incomprehensible and ongoing magnitude of massacres, rape, starvation, boarding schools, and smallpox. Wilderson’s work has provided me with some of the tools to describe the gap between coherence and incoherence, a gap which is made especially evident in debate rounds. And particularly clear is that Native debate[[1]](https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/" \l "_ftn1) is inclined towards talking in the grammar of sovereignty rather than genocide.

I am here preoccupied with our enunciative capacities in debate—with what I perceive “Native debate,” and specifically non-Black Native debaters, to be doing in service of Settler/Master (mis)recognition, what the consequences of such doing might be, and what it might mean to push against the disciplining force of recognition in debate. The ontological fact of genocide/sovereignty as a dual positioning for Native people, coupled with academia’s push to identify ourselves at the site of (coherent and recognizable) trauma (what Wilderson terms “intra-human conflicts”), has led Native thought in debate, broadly, to do three related things: 1) prioritize the coherent discussion of sovereign loss over one of genocide and its incoherence, 2) articulate ourselves as always in conversation with (read: traumatized by) the Settler, 3) distance ourselves from a Black/Red conversation or from Black/Red theorizing. These three moves are all antiblack in addition to being an insidious manifestation of the genocide that structures half of our (non?)being.Depressingly, if we were to historicize “Native debate,” we would have to begin with a litany of non-Native debaters reading “Give Back the Land,” offering sovereignty as a solution to a tragic history of genocide that relegates Native people to phobic/phillic objects of the past whose futures are in the hands of those Settlers who bravely dare to talk about them. The terrain in which everyone can become Native—or at least become an advocate for Natives—is a cleared landscape produced by genocide but also, significantly, produced by antiblack slavery.[[2]](https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/" \l "_ftn2) This history of non-Native debaters’ representations of sovereignty, land repatriation, and treaty rights as the only solution to genocide also reaches into the present. What is most disturbing to me about this ongoing history is that we have yet to tie virtually any debate round to actual, material land repatriation, sovereign gains, or the upholding of treaty rights. These material gains involve labor from Native people organizing at the grassroots level, not an academic labor from Settlers. Debate arguments do not facilitate sovereign benefits for Native peoples. Further, the struggle for sovereignty itself does not overcome or solve genocide. The removal of the Hunkpapa Lakota Oyate and their relatives at the Oceti Sakowin camp at Standing Rock should be proof enough of this—sovereignty as a politic is often met with, rather than resolving, genocidal violence. Non-Black Native people in debate have performed a similar land-based politic. **Native debate has become** so **associated with words like “land,” “sovereignty,” “space,”** “place,” “treaty rights,” and others, **that it is** almost **impossible to theorize Native debate absent sovereignty** as a grammar that marks our existence. So **both non-Native** debaters (who claim to advocate for Native peoples’ sovereignty) **and Native debaters** (who claim to advocate for something that usually falls into the grammar of sovereignty) a**re talking in essentially the same register, with incredibly limited slippage towards genocide as a vector of violence.** And, for Native people, like non-Natives, debate arguments do not and cannot facilitate the material elements of decolonization that these land-based arguments frequently rely upon.[[3]](https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/" \l "_ftn3) Sovereign gains don’t happen in debate rounds, but for some reason the (mis)recognition of Native enunciation as sovereignty persists, in that the word “land” harkens to Native debate in almost every instance, that almost every debate involving Native people reading perceptibly “Native” arguments includes a discussion of “treaties” or “sovereignty” or “land-based pedagogy” or “spatiality.” What other reason could this be than a structure of desire around recognition from the Settler/Master? If we really follow the history of how “Nativeness” has been misrepresented in debate by Settlers, it becomes clear that much of contemporary Native debate, strangely (or as I argue, not so strangely), mimics these misrepresentations. Of course, debate is an economy of (mis)recognition. That “Native” becomes coextensive with “land” in debate is no accident. It is an enunciation that has been evoked prior to the involvement of any Native debaters or coaches. And it is reiterated by non-Black Native debaters with increasing certainty about the truthiness of Native relationships to the land. **Systematically absent from this conversation, of course, is a discussion of genocide**. I have gestured above towards the ways that the desire for recognition from the Settler/Master motivates this conceptual move towards the register of sovereignty. As Wilderson writes,“The crowding out, or disavowal, of the genocide modality [by the sovereign modality] allows the Settler/’Savage’ struggle to appear as a conflict rather than as an antagonism. This has therapeutic value for both the ‘Savage’ and the Settler: the mind can grasp the fight, conceptually put it into words. To say, ‘You stole my land and pilfered and appropriated my culture’ and then produce books, articles, and films that travel back and forth along the vectors of those conceptually coherent accusations is less threatening to the integrity of the ego, than to say, ‘You culled me down from 19 million to 250,000.’”[[4]](https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/" \l "_ftn4) This gesture towards conceptual coherence and therapeutic value is why there is a celebrated and ongoing association between “land” and “Native” in both non-Native argumentation and in arguments made by Native people. It is why we cannot theorize about Native debate absent the contingent register of sovereignty. I am hesitant to claim that sovereignty should be completely abandoned as an analytic for obvious reasons—I think Wilderson also gives credit to indigenous conceptions of sovereignty, what it unseats, and how it operates, while still articulating a critique of sovereignty unrivaled by much of Native studies. I am not interested in suggesting that all Native people ignore our peoples’ land relationships or histories of broken treaties as politic throughout the United States or the world. I agree with Qwo-Li Driskill’s suggestion, alongside similar ones from other Native theorists, that sovereignty must be re-theorized significantly rather than echoing the propertied enterprise that confers legibility to state formations. Regardless of my reluctance to disavow the potential for sovereignty as a politic outside debate rounds, I think it is obvious that sovereignty in its terms in debate—as a recognized and fundamentally “Native” utterance—is genocidal and anti-Black. Broadly, my argument is that genocide is an undertheorized arm of an antagonism that halfway positions Native people, and that the basis of such undertheorization is the desire to be (mis)recognized as nearly-Human by the Settler. This claim invites an investigation of the context of (mis)recognition in debate and what is particular about debate itself with regard to Wilderson’s theory of position. Debate is inevitably a space of recognition, coherence, and transparency. It seeks to uncover, make clear, and expand consciousness more than it promises to occlude, hide, or make incoherent. This condition of debate is significant not because that makes it different from the rest of the academy, or the rest of civil society, but because it offers a specific situation from which to apply the critique of recognition. In the age of academic identity politics, the identification of the self as a subject of trauma has emerged as the primary locus of (recognizable) enunciation. Many who are familiar with Eve Tuck’s work have read her critical analysis on the academy’s demand for damage-centered narratives and the kinds of traumatized neoliberal subjectivity they produce—as those who are continually indebted to a parasitic regime of recognition. When this critique is applied in debate, it frequently targets identity-politics models of intervention in academia which posit the traumatized subject as a primary locus of critique. For example, many of the ableism debates I’ve judged contained arguments locked entirely in this register—where the traumatized subject is itself offered as a structural analytic in a manner that is always parasitic on Blackness. Teams who read arguments that they refer to as “disability pessimism” and describe disability as a form of “ontological death” often go on to claim that no change has come from reading critical arguments in debate and that we should be pessimistic about the ability for debate to become more inclusive of disabled people. This is, at best, an appropriation of Afropessimism based on a reductive reading of Black debate. Significantly, the misrecognition of Black debate that is rearticulated through “disability pessimism” also includes the secondary claim that critical argumentation has not produced shifts in the institutional schema of debate. But “disability pessimism” would not exist without Black debate. You can’t bite Afropessimism and then disavow the intellectual labor of Black people as the condition of possibility for your argument. Worse still, “things have never changed in debate for disabled people,” is not an advocacy. It is just a recognized enunciation of the trauma of degraded subjectivity. In this example, the degraded subject masquerades trauma as analysis while occluding structural phenomena. They merely say, “The world is a horrible and traumatizing place for me, therefore listen to me reiterate my trauma.” And more often than not, as Eve Tuck writes, “All we are left with is the damage.”[[5]](https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/" \l "_ftn5) These so-called interventions posited by identity politicians are ineffective in that they fail to provide a solution to a problem that they have misidentified because of their own egoistic (contingent) investments. In other words, in an instance of identity politics, where trauma must be isolable, human, subjectified, and coherent in order to be validated as authenticity by the Settler/Master, sovereignty gets the job done in a way genocide does not. Again, it is the assumption that recognition by the Settler/Master is favorable, or even necessary, that motivates Native people’s investments in arguments about land, space, place, sovereignty, and treaties. It is also this assumption that facilitates the false move to authenticity (false in that it is only given coherence by a genocidal and antiblack apparatus of recognition). Native people have been (mis)recognized by the Settler/Master since Taino peoples were met with Columbus’ genocidal misrecognitions in 1492. Much of this (mis)recognition rests on the incoherence of genocide. “Genocide is not a name for violence in the way that ‘arson’ is; genocide is a linguistic placeholder connoting that violence which out-strips the power of connotation. To represent it we have to dismantle it, pretend that we can identify its component parts, force a name into its hole—macrocytes, spur cells, kidneys at half-throttle, a thoroughly ulcerated stomach, Wounded Knee, Sand Creek—and make it what it is not, the way one fills the tucked sleeve of a one-armed boy. But these fillers, these phantom limbs of connotation, can only be imagined separately, and as such they take on the ruse of items that science, love, aesthetics, or justice—some form of symbolic intervention—can attend to and set right. They become treatable, much like the massacre at Wounded Knee were it not for the fact that to comprehend Wounded Knee, three hundred-plus men, women, and children in a snow-filled ravine, one must comprehend those three hundred synchronically over three thousand miles (the forty-eight contiguous states) and diachronically over five hundred years. Here, madness sets in and the promises of symbolic intervention turn to dust. We are returned to the time and space of no time and space, the ‘terminal.’”[6] The magnitude of this hole—the impossibility of representing or narrativizing how genocide as a modality continues to position not just Native peoples but the extent to which it is a structural principle of modernity itself—is not easy. It is certainly not as easy to articulate in a debate round as sovereign loss is, nor is it as easy for Settlers to hear. In order to no longer occlude the emergence of Red/Black theorizing in debate, non-Black Native people in debate must begin speaking in the register of incoherence, which demands engaging conceptually and argumentatively with Black people in debate. The avoidance of such a conversation (or series of conversations) can only be rooted in antiblackness and will only reproduce antiblackness. While Native people can be recognized by the Settlers we are talking to in the register of sovereignty, structurally, Black people (including people who are Black and Native) have no such register at the level of ontology. “Whereas Humans exist on some plane of being and thus can become existentially present through some struggle for, of, or through recognition, Blacks cannot reach this plane.”[7] The simultaneous coherence and incoherence of the “Savage” position has thus far led non-Black Native people collectively to invest ourselves in antiblack kinship relations in debate that refuse to speak to or with Black people except when using them as a scapegoat to gain recognition from the Settler/Master institution of debate. This is because, more often than not, non-Black Native debaters are only tasked with talking to Settlers. I don’t mean this in terms of whether we have white friends—I mean argumentatively and conceptually, our work is creating a Settler/Native binary that conspicuously erases and systematically under-theorizes Blackness, antiblackness, slavery/prison, and Black people. Too many non-Black Native debaters don’t even have an answer to the question of whether Black people are Settlers. That there are Native debaters who feel ambiguous about this question at all suggests the rootedness of Native debate in antiblackness. It is beyond the scope of this letter to offer specific critiques of the myriad of (inadequate) ways that many non-Black Native scholars claim to “position” “Blackness,” but it is overwhelmingly true that their discussion of antiblackness consistently describes it as a system of racial identification subservient to settler colonialism. In debate, however, this neglects the indebtedness of non-Black Native debaters to the intellectual and argumentative labor of Black debaters, coaches, and judges. In other words, to reduce antiblackness in debate to a system of racial identification subsumed structurally by settler colonialism is ahistorical, given that it has been the work of Black people in debate that has made Native debate possible at all, as tenuous and numerically small as we are. Why, then, are non-Black Native people in debate so invested in describing settler colonialism as the sole matrix of power under which violence operates? Much of this scholarship (Eve Tuck’s work, Jodie Byrd’s, and other similar texts from Native studies) critiques integrationist elements of Black studies as seeking inclusion in the national project—but Afropessimism broadly, and Wilderson’s work specifically, is far from integrationist. To my knowledge (which is extensive but obviously not exhaustive when it comes to Native debate), non-Black Native debaters have been largely unwilling to contend with the thesis of Wilderson’s book, even when reading other scholars who allege disagreement with him, as most of these scholars do, from the vantage point of sovereignty. A coherent conversation with the Settler about sovereignty in debate is unlikely to challenge the (mis)recognition that leads to the high level of politicization around who is really Native and who is not. Similarly, the numeric lack of Native people in debate, as a function of genocide itself, makes it difficult to articulate what Native resistance has been, is going to be, or even what it is doing right now. Rather than an aspirational politic that suggests we should culturally infuse debate with indigeneity (the implicit endpoint of many of these conversations about “decolonization” which are ultimately revivalist and inclusionist attempts related to Native spiritual or cultural practices), there is an (under-theorized) incoherence to our position that I believe should motivate us to enter into the fraught terrain of Red/Black theorizing. Nothing Native is happening in debate—not that there are not Native people in debate, but I do not believe debate is a space that we should aspire to “indigenize,” “decolonize,” or anything in that register. In debate, Native people are misrecognized, whether through technologies of capture like blood quantum mythologies, misreadings of indigenous cosmologies, or genocidal imaginations of Noble Savages. Fuck non-Black non-Native people who are structurally responsible for those misrecognitions. To the degree that recognition is inevitable in debate, I think many of us are pushed by our coaches, debate partners, by those who judge us, and by civil society more broadly, to articulate ourselves within those frames in order to authenticate ourselves. This is my analysis of trauma politics above. How does the register of authenticity change when we are talking to someone other than the Settler/Master and their junior partners? I believe it changes significantly. I believe that for Native debate to a) increase meaningful Native participation in debate,[8] b) attend to the irreconcilable genocidal question that for us always undergirds sovereignty but can never be coherent in the way that sovereignty and land loss can, and c) attend to social death and the non-position of the Black, it is imperative that we stop talking to and for white people argumentatively.

### Case

#### Aff’s retrofitting of their method to the res is a paradigm of compatibility that insists on particular vernaculars that maintain methodological nationalism and imperial relations – this maintains the false objectivity of white academics which reproduces social submission

Newell and Stavrianakis 17 (Peter, Professor of International Relations at the University of Sussex; Anna, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of Teaching and Learning in the School of Global Studies at the University of Sussex. “Beyond the “Ivory Tower”? IR in the world,” *What’s the Point of International Relations?*, Chapter 16, pg 209-214 //shree)

Fifth, the nature and degree of access and the scope for influence is also a product of the nature of the issue area that IR academics work in. It is clearly harder to shape ministries and parts of the state dealing with “high” politics of core state strategy around security and economy where secrecy and confidentiality are at a premium. This poses a key challenge for the discipline of IR given the weight afforded to those areas of study in the discipline and somewhat easier for other issue areas such as health, environment, and development where weak bureaucracies sometimes seek allies among academia and NGOs to reinforce their position in internal battles over resources, power, and influence. The same is to some extent true of corporations where those parts of the company most open to engagement are often the least powerful internally. It also needs to be recognized that any attempt by IR researchers to generate change or impact through their work has different starting points for entering the conversation, not only in terms of individuals’ access and networks, but also in terms of how much meaningful scope there is to shift the terms of debate. Often in practice this means engaging on others’ terms in order to be heard. Examples might include those we illustrate later around the arms trade and the lack of space to seriously debate the merits of the UK’s Trident nuclear program given the open hostility and mockery by military leaders of the UK Labour party leader Jeremy Corbyn’s position that he would not be willing to use nuclear weapons. In relation to environmental issues the relevant parallel might be the difficulty of questioning the use and effectiveness of payments for ecosystem services in the face of such widespread policy support for market mechanisms. Certain framings are seemingly non-negotiable for researchers and activists. Sixth, there is the question of the positionality of academics when it comes to the types of engagement academics are willing and able to contemplate. There are issues of seniority and age, security of contract, and gender. In terms of stage of career, how much safety academics have in their job to speak out and potentially antagonize employers and funders has a key bearing on who is able to speak out on what issues. At our own university controversies over the offering of an associate position to a NATO official, around the privatization of some university services (the 235 campaign), or around fossil fuel divestment (“fossilfree Sussex”) have involved many IR academics in ways which have led to difficult negotiations about when to speak out and to whom and in what capacity. In the more conservative context of the US system, in terms of both the tenure system and the political culture which inhibits junior scholars from stepping out of line or upsetting managers who have the power to withhold tenured employment from them, research aimed at policy elites and incremental change appears to be a far safer bet. In the UK, the Research Excellence Framework, which places increasing emphasis on demonstrating nonacademic impact culture, has similar effects by rewarding more senior figures with ample access to policy elites to generate impact. Engaging on climate change and the arms trade How do these factors that constrain, enable, and shape the role of IR scholarship play out in practice? In what follows, we offer two sets of brief personal reflections on engaged scholarship around climate change (Newell) and the arms trade (Stavrianakis). Newell has engaged with these dilemmas and pressures through working closely with a range of campaigning organizations from the earliest days of his research career. During his PhD he worked at Friends of the Earth UK and Climate Network Europe in Brussels. More recently he has been working with Carbon Market Watch, based in Brussels, on exposing flaws in global carbon market mechanisms and their impact on more marginalized groups in particular. Central among these has been the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a UN market-based offset mechanism created under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol that allows richer countries, with legal obligations to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, to pay poorer ones for projects that reduce these emissions more cheaply. In return, developing countries are meant to receive local sustainable development benefits, such as jobs, technology, and improved health and environmental outcomes. His research highlighted a number of key governance deficits in relation to participation, accountability, coordination, and capacity, which are inhibiting the ability of governments to realize sustainable developmental benefits from CDM projects. It examined these governance issues at a range of levels, from the UN’s CDM Executive Board, to national governments that have responsibility for approving and screening projects, down to local bodies that oversee consultations and participation with local communities about the risks and benefits of projects they are asked to host. Controversially, it found widespread evidence of collusion, corruption, and exclusion in decision-making and project approval processes. It found that decision-making tends to revolve around tightly knit networks of project developers, financiers, regulators, and auditors, while many key stakeholders are not adequately consulted. The research also found many examples of a “revolving door” between national officials, project developers, and verification agencies, often even occupying more than one role at the same time. The research highlighted the need for redress mechanisms and efforts to monitor and evaluate whether or not sustainable development benefits are being delivered by projects, as well as to ensure that adequate opportunities are provided for participation in and consultation over the projects. The findings were supportive, therefore, of a wave of NGO concern about the effectiveness and beneficiaries of carbon markets. Timing – doing research that was useful and relevant to the debate at an opportune moment – was crucial to the relationships Newell was able to form. A sense of a legitimacy crisis among key UN bodies and corporate carbon traders seeking to defend themselves from criticism increased governments’ and NGO actors’ receptivity to what he was saying in seeking to reform carbon markets in the case of the UK government, for example, and to reduce their use in the case of several NGOs (Newell 2014). Such was the sensitivity of the issue in late 2011 amid growing scandals around the social and human rights impacts of CDM projects and questions around gaming and fraud in the buying and selling of permits, that the head of the UN’s CDM Executive Board attended Newell’s final project workshop to debate the issues. Recognition of expertise was another key factor. An Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC – one of the main academic funding bodies in the UK) “leadership fellowship” generated resources to facilitate the research having an impact on policy and helped Newell to secure access to key players through meetings hosted by the ESRC with government officials and others. A self-reinforcing circle was generated between research and recognition whereby opportunities for “invited engagement” increased. For example, the UN CDM Executive Board – the highest governmental decision-making body on carbon markets – held a closed retreat in September 2011 to discuss challenges facing the CDM in the wake of the crises engulfing global carbon markets noted earlier. Newell was included among the “well-known leaders and thinkers in this area” and produced a briefing note for the participants based on his research. This episode also points to the uneven openness and receptivity of different parts of the state to research critical of international governance actors. His research was used by the UK government’s Department for International Development (DfID) in its submission to the UN regarding the reform of carbon markets. This department has a somewhat more skeptical position toward the role of carbon markets in combatting climate change than other parts of the UK government, and hence was more disposed to draw on research that was critical of the way carbon markets function. This is a good example of how actors can use research and the support of expert networks to bolster their positions in policy battles with more powerful actors. Finally, Newell’s experience illustrates the challenges and dilemmas of proximity to activists. His relationship with Carbon Market Watch has helped to promote his research among activists, and it has also provided an important vehicle for getting access to key UN bodies. Yet proximity to activists has also brought challenges and dilemmas. Being considered too close to a group like Carbon Market Watch has led to criticism from government and carbon traders, who claim the closeness discredits the neutrality of the findings of his work: a convenient way of delegitimizing research that questions policy orthodoxies. Criticism also comes from more radical movements with whom leading scholars are aligned, who view any such engagement as misplaced and lending legitimacy to a problematic solution to climate change (Lohman 2012). On other occasions, however, he has played precisely on the fiction of scholarly objectivity and neutrality accorded to academic research when presenting findings to UK parliamentary select committees and parliamentary groups. Arguments are heard differently depending on who is making them, and academics can often say things that their more politically situated allies cannot. Overall, his experience has been that the boundaries between research, activism, and policy are blurred and problematic given the frequent interchange between different roles and the fact that academics occupy many of these roles simultaneously. Several of the same themes emerge in Stavrianakis’ work on arms transfer control. She, too, has worked with NGOs and campaign organizations and faced some of the same dilemmas and tensions. In her case, it was the process of doing PhD research on NGO strategies in relation to the arms trade that pushed her politically more toward the critical, “outsider” end of the activist spectrum. The more she learnt about the arms trade, the more oriented toward activism she became. Yet her experience has been that academia provides the freedom and autonomous space to say things that cannot be said in an NGO or campaigner capacity. In this sense, her research is not directly for NGOs or campaigners. During interview work for her research, for example, she was repeatedly struck by not only the variety of opinions among NGO staffers, but how radical and critical the views often were of those who worked within “insider” organizations. Yet those “personal” views could not be translated into their organizations’ policy and strategy. This led her to think increasingly about the structural disciplining of NGOs and about the ways that academic and NGO/campaign research can be made to complement each other. Over the past decade or so, she has moved between oppositional activism and questioning the binary between theory and activism. She has experienced this as a recursive move in and out of engagement and in and out of theory, in which activism and scholarship inform each other, but remain distinct as social activities. This highlights the importance of translation (Stavrianakis 2006) but also is suggestive of how varied the political space is. Some arguments can be heard politically and are thus ripe for direct policy activism, whereas others are beyond the pale. For example, a term’s sabbatical spent in Saferworld’s China team led directly to policy-relevant briefing papers – welcomed, in part, because of the way the UK government’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office has effectively outsourced its research capacity to insider NGOs, given funding cuts and changes to the character of the civil service. Meanwhile, academic articles that explore the ramifications of the Arms Trade Treaty for liberal states’ arms transfer practice (e.g., Stavrianakis 2016) grew out of, and also shaped, engagement with practitioners (diplomats, NGO staffers, experts) through participant observation at NGO and diplomatic meetings. This sort of work has policy ramifications, but does not readily lead to policy-relevant recommendations. This is in contrast to her research on the imperial relations of racialized gun control and the problem of methodological nationalism. This sort of research is too far removed from where the policy debate is to have any practical application: the battle is so politicized that there is very little space for engagement that broadens the boundaries. Hence, it is harder to trace the impact of the latter on policy (whether of the state, corporations, or NGOs): it is not obvious who the target audience is or what immediate change might be possible. There are several key practice-based issues that Stavrianakis has found repeated over the years. These include the importance of paradigm compatibility, or speaking the same language as those with whom scholars are engaging. Given her research trajectory and political orientation, this has been easier with NGOs than with government departments, and within government, easier with elements of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and DfID than the Ministry of Defence (MoD) or Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). Relatedly, she has been faced with the question of whether she is engaging with practitioners (whether NGO or government) to influence them, to share knowledge with them, or to conduct research on them. With some NGOs it has ended up being the former two elements; with the MoD it has ended up being the latter. Even with NGOs and campaign groups there are lines of argument beyond the political pale or strategically beyond the bounds of what can usefully be said. NGOs are often seen as the “good guys” against governments, but their positions are also circumscribed by politics. This puts academics in a difficult position when they are seen to criticize or not be on board with more progressive actors. This often results in an “ivory tower” criticism, but to return to the model of scholarship as practice outlined earlier, there remains a value in academics’ autonomous positioning to articulate uncomfortable positions based on their research. On the other hand, it is important to reflect on the ways academics are disciplined in a variety of ways. For Stavrianakis, her experience has been one of wanting to be seen as reliable, respectable, or reasonable: not only to get access to the MoD, FCO, and other “hard” elements of the state, but also to be able to talk to them, for us to hear each other. Yet any listening or hearing is always on their terms. Here the fiction of objectivity is useful but troublesome and limited – it is shot through with power relations. Attempting to use her position as an academic by acting as an expert witness in an Information Tribunal case brought by an anti–arms trade activist, she was repeatedly accused by government barristers of being a mouthpiece for Campaign Against Arms Trade – an anti-arms group with whom she has developed a relationship over the years. Her expert knowledge has been generated in part through involvement with activists; but when she used that knowledge as an ostensibly disinterested expert (the precondition for being called as an expert), there was an attempt to discredit her by more powerful actors. This illustrates the challenges of engagement: as academics we are autonomous but not disconnected and have to negotiate the political terrain at each turn. Conclusion Reflecting on similarities and differences across these two case studies and how they relate to the three types of interaction outlined, it is evident that there are practical issues that resonate with the policy engagement model. Timing, windows of opportunity, serendipity, speaking in the same terms as interlocutors, and so on are all significant practical challenges. There are also larger political issues at stake that speak to the second and third models of activism and scholarship as practice. These include the useful but troublesome fiction of disinterested scholarly neutrality, the role of research in generating a sense of crisis, the potential to bolster the position of weaker actors that require support, and the difficulties of creating openings for articulating different views in policy debate. These challenges give a different slant to the way we evaluate the impact of research beyond the university. Rather than valorizing research that is useful to state policy or enhances competitiveness (the explicit aim of the ESRC, for example), the key criterion could be whether research holds power (be it states or capital or civil society) to account. As UK citizens and UK-based academics, the key question is how to hold state power in the core of the international system to account. In both cases, that state power is allied to the power of capital – and at times to the power of NGOs. For example, in the case of the arms trade, while the MoD and BIS operate in tandem with military capital, DfID and parts of the FCO have (weaker) alliances with NGOs, so NGOs are integrated into the operation of state power (Stavrianakis 2010). So the question of whom to hold to account, and for what, is more complicated than we might initially think. These issues mean we require a more nuanced view of where and how impact happens and with or to whom, taking into account all of the contingencies earlier about available spaces, risks involved, and the nature of the issue. Understanding the nature of the relationship between academia and the world beyond the university is inherently political. Failure to address the politics of engagement means we run the risk of powerful academics having powerful voices with powerful people, creating a self-reproducing dynamic and diminishing the prospects of progressive change. Thinking about where power is located and how it operates requires us to go beyond homogenizing accounts of key actors (be they states, corporations, international organizations, or NGOs) without being naive about the scope for autonomy and the willingness of powerful actors to engage with researchers and act on their findings.

#### Politics of grief reinvest in the vitalism of those dead – turns the aff

Negarestani ‘8 – Reza, Iranian philosopher and writer, known for "pioneering the genre of 'theory-fiction,’ “Hauntology, or a shady vitalism,” Oct. 28, 2008,

It seems that the problem of hauntology is inherent to any ontological system built on the primacy of intelligibility of being, persistence (continuation of being as such) and above all the possibility of determination of being in terms of being and only being. The influence of the specter over the living (the haunt) and the supposedly necessary negative binding of the specter by the living (mourning) suggest a process of negative binding of belonging qua dead whereby the living / being can determine itself and correlate itself to an ideality of some sort (the intelligibility, the possibility of determination of being qua being, the One, vitalism, etc.) To put it differently, only by binding the dead as a negative agency can the living establish its myth of inherent persistence, intelligibility and difference or determination as such. As argued in Collapse IV (The Corpse Bride) and else where, the binding of belonging qua dead, or more accurately, the influence of the haunting specter is necessary in order to transform the nomos of the dead into the nous of the living. The haunt demarcates the extensive or outward bond between the living and the dead. We know that such a bond extending outwardly from the living to the dead and from the dead back to the living suggests a contingent realm since it is established outside of the (supposed) ideal necessity of the living. We also know that 'determination of being as such' must unilateralize its distinction (or living as a difference in itself) both intensively and extensively, in regard to itself as an ideal possibility (qua being) and in regard to the undetermined qua the realm of the dead. It is the necessity of the latter (i.e. the determination of being against the undetermined or that which does not belong to the living) that makes hauntology inherent to the possibility of determination of being as such. In other words, determination of being / the living can only ground its ideal status by instrumentalizing the contingent bond with belonging qua dead. This instrumental binding of the dead (explicated by Aristotle for the first time) is comprised of the two fundamental aspects of hauntology: First, it is the haunt or the negative binding of contingency. It imports the dead as a belonging or negative agency capable of supporting the intensive determination of the living (living as a difference in itself) independent of the contingent outside or the realm of the dead. To put it succinctly, contingency of the outside is bound negatively so as to support the positive necessity of the living according to its own terms i.e. determination of the living as such. The haunt allows the contingent indeterminate (or the dead) to return to and influence the living only as a negative or subtractive support. Why? Because this machinery of subtraction is capable of conserving an inner part in the form of an ideal necessity (being qua being) by instrumentalizing the negation or subtraction of belonging. In fact, whenever negation or subtractive employment of non-belonging (i.e. the universal principle of negativity) is factored in as an extensive (outward) vector, it can be indexed by an ideal necessity from within (i.e. intensive grounding of a precarious ideal). In ontological systems, this ideal is usually vitalism, difference in itself, the One or the nous. [1] The second elemental aspect of hauntology is mourning. Mourning correlates the implicit affirmation of the possibility of 'the living as a difference in itself' with the explicit 'declaration of the haunt as a negative agency'. This correlation is at the same time a utilitarian bond between the living and the dead and a pre-established correlation as in correlationism (Meillassoux). As a utilitarian bond between the dead and the living, the act of mourning puts the dead into the service of the living so as to get rid of the vengeful dead (subtracting belonging qua dead) and rescue the intensive determination of the living. The rescuing mission of mourning makes the living independent of the dead (i.e. it supports the unilateral distinction of being as an ontological necessity). The utilitarian bond that mourning establishes subtracts the dead only to conserve an inner part or a remainder qua living. On the other hand, mourning is posited on a supposedly inherent interrelation between the living and the dead wherein neither the dead nor the living can act or be faced independently. That means the dead and the living are always taken as a wedded couple for which the determination of one always rests upon the givenness of the other. Mourning emphatically reinscribes the givenness of correlation (between the living and the dead, the contingent outside qua undetermined and the determinable necessity of being / the living). What is mourned is not the specter of the lingering dead but the correlation of the living with the dead constructed on the presumption that the contingency of the outside or the indeterminable realm of the dead can be accessed by the living. Mourning is the correlationism between a self-posited ontological necessity (the living) and the contingency of the outside (the world of the dead as that which does not belong to the living), between X and not-X. For this reason, I think Quentin Meillassoux's speculative solution to the "spectral dilemma" of atheism and religion which proposes an "essential mourning" (in accordance with the thesis of divine inexistence) is heavily reliant on a twisted form of correlationism. This of course, by no means, can serve as evidence that Meillassoux's ethico-political move in Spectral Dilemma is doomed to fall into the trap of correlationism. It rather attests to the vulnerability of hauntology and its innately non-speculative solutions restrained by the correlationist nature of the haunt and mourning. Hanutology, to this extent, firstly adheres to a shady vitalism in which the binding of the dead and its influence as a negative agency implicitly contributes to the intensive determination of being qua ideal (i.e. being in terms of itself or the intelligible). Hauntology, at least subtractively, supports the possibility of determination of being as such (the living as a difference in itself). The problem is not only that for hauntology, the living or ontological necessity as an Ideal is always given but that vitalism of the living can also employ hauntological solutions or the politics of the haunt to negatively underpin its so-called intensive necessity, proving itself to be alive. Ironically, hauntology is the speculative solution of vitalism for withstanding the absolute contingency of the void qua non-belonging. Through hauntology, vitalism is able to establish an instrumental affect with belonging qua dead. The haunt (or the traumatic influence of the dead over the living) is an inevitable consequence of such an instrumental affect determined by the vitalistic ideal. If hauntology is so decisive in determination of vitalism, then no wonder why hauntology offers speculative means of survival to the more resilient forms of capitalism hidden behind shady doctrines of vitalism. In addition to its clandestine alliance with vitalism, hauntology is essentially constructed on a correlationist assumption that there is a given interrelation between the dead and the living, the contingency of the outside and the ontological necessity subsumed with being or the living. By means of such correlation, the dead and the living can affect each other, access each other's realms so that the nomos of the dead be utilized on behalf of the nous of the living. The resolving capacity of mourning in rescuing the living from the haunting memory of the dead (as proposed by Meillassoux) is precisely the result of the correlationist nature of mourning which can capture the dead and the living in regard to each other. Now that hauntology seems to be a surreptitious enforcer of vitalism and an acolyte of correlationism, then how can we rescue Meillassoux's speculative solution in Spectral Dilemma?